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ARGUMENT 
A. A SETTLEMENT BASED UPON THE TWO LETTERS 
OF COUNSEL SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ENFORCED. 
CTX in its Brief claims that the terms of the settlement 
are contained in the two letters exchanged by counsel. There are 
several problems with this assertion. First, the terms discussed 
in the letters exchanged by counsel were never agreed to by all the 
parties; Second, letters were never exchanged by counsel for all 
the parties involved; and finally, CTX proceeded contrary to the 
terms in the letters, both in this case and the other cases 
discussed in the letters. 
Both of the letters exchanged required a global settle-
ment of a total of five cases. CTX's letter of March 14, 1995 
(record 720-721) requires "a global settlement of all of the above 
referenced cases," a total of five cases were referenced in the 
letter. Some of the other cases involved Rukavina as a party, and 
some of the other cases did not involve Rukavina as a party. One 
of the case, CTX Properties v. Eloise Barney, involved another 
party, i.e. Eloise Barney, who was not even represented by Shane 
Smith or Budge Call, of Smith & Hanna. 
Eloise Barney was represented by attorney Lynn Mabey of 
Murphy, Tolboe & Mabey. The March 14, 1995, letter was addressed 
L. Benson Mabey, Esq., Murphy, Tolboe & Mabey, 124 South 600 East, 
Suite 100, Salt Lake City Utah, 84102 and the paragraph designated 
number 4 in the letter deals directly with the settlement terms of 
CTX Properties v. Eloise Barney. Therefore, Rukavina and his 
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counsel could not have accepted these terms on behalf of Eloise 
Barney, and thus, could not have accepted all of the terms of the 
March 14, 1995 letter in the March 16, 1995 letter. All the 
parties did not agree or accept the terms set forth in the two 
letters of counsel, and therefore, the court should not have 
enforced a settlement based on these two letters. 
Furthermore, the letter sent by Rukavina's counsel, dated 
March 16, 1995, did not accept the terms as proposed in the March 
14, 1995 letter for Rukavina. In fact, the March 16, 1995 letter 
rejected and made modifications to the terms proposed in the March 
14, 1995 letter. Thus, Rukavina, in effect, rejected the proposal 
in the March 14, 1995 letter and made a counteroffer to CTX. CTX, 
however, did not accept this counteroffer, refused to settle all 
the cases, and proceeded with litigation in this case, and in the 
other cases. 
The parties knew and understood there was no settlement 
reached on the terms discussed in the letters. The parties' 
conduct is evidence of this. The parties did not execute the 
Settlement Agreement and CTX elected to continue with litigation in 
all the cases1. CTX even continued with its motions in this case, 
which were heard on April 3, 1995, more than two weeks after the 
letters were exchanged in this case. This alone, would estop CTX 
l
. CTX claims that the fact it decided not to seek enforcement 
of the settlement in the other cases is irrelevant; however, it is 
relevant when the agreement CTX claimed was reached between the 
parties in the two letters was an agreement to settle all the 
cases. Furthermore, the actions of CTX in proceeding with this 
case alone is sufficient to show no agreement was reached and/or to 
constitute waiver and estoppel. 
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from claiming that a settlement was reached. CTX cannot pursue, 
and the court cannot rule, on CTX's Motions in April of 1995, and 
then go back and enforce a settlement allegedly reached through 
letters exchanged a month earlier in March 19952. 
Moreover, CTX in its Brief claims that the court made a 
finding that the parties' failure to reach an agreement was 
"comparatively unsubstantial" to bar enforcement of the settlement 
agreement. The court never made such a finding and CTX has failed 
to cite this alleged finding to the record, as required under the 
rules. To reach a settlement there must be a meeting of the minds, 
as in contract law, if the court did find that the failure to reach 
an agreement was unsubstantial, such a finding would be in error. 
Finally, this is not a case of Rukavina simply trying to 
welch out of an agreement. All of the parties had not yet reached 
an agreement and it was CTX who rejected Rukavina's counteroffer in 
the March 16, 1995 letter and proceeded with litigation in this 
case, as well as, in the other cases. 
B. THE GLOBAL SETTLEMENT REQUIRED IN THE 
TWO LETTERS COULD NOT BE UNILATERALLY 
WAIVED BY CTX. 
CTX's claim that the global settlement required in the 
letters could simply be waived by CTX fails for several reasons. 
First, the letter of March 16, 1995, did not simply accept the 
terms of the March 14, 1995 letter as written. It rejected and 
2
. CTX's argument that it had to proceed with litigation is 
not valid. CTX could have filed its Motion to Enforce Settlement 
prior to these hearings. CTX did not file its Motion to Enforce 
Settlement until after the hearings. 
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made modifications to a number of terms in the March 14, 1995 
letter, and therefore, constituted a rejection of the March 14, 
1995 letter and a counteroffer. Cal Wadsworth Constr. v. St. 
George, 865 P.2d 1373, (Utah 1993) (a reply to an offer, though 
purporting to accept it, which adds qualifications or requires 
performance of conditions, is not an acceptance but is a counter-
offer) , accord Candland v. Oldroyd, 248 P. 1101, 1102 (Utah 1926). 
Therefore, the global settlement was not solely the 
requirement of CTX, but also of Rukavina as contained in his 
counteroffer of March 16, 1995. In fact, the modifications and 
requirements of Rukavina contained in the March 16, 1995, letter 
dealt with the settlement terms proposed in the other cases. 
CTX also claims that only CTX was to benefit from the 
global settlement. This is simply not true. The global settlement 
was not only to benefit CTX, but also Rukavina. For example, in 
the global settlement, Rukavina was to settle another case, in 
which he was a party with a principal of CTX, styled Rukavina v. 
Triatlantic. This case is referenced in the letters, and in the 
March 16, 1995 counteroffer of Rukavina, Triatlantic was to forgive 
its judgment against Rukavina in this case. (See paragraph b of 
March 16, 1995 letter, record 825) . Rukavina was obviously to 
obtain a benefit from the global settlement; therefore, CTX cannot 
simply waive this requirement. 
C. THE COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE GRANTED CTX'S 
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS. 
The trial court should not have granted judgment on the 
pleadings in this case. In the pleadings filed by Rukavina he 
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claims that he is entitled to relief for a number of reasons, the 
claim that he was the owner of the property pursuant to the lease 
and the option to purchase contained in the lease was only one 
assertion. 
In accepting the allegations in Rukavina's pleadings as 
true, the court could not have granted judgment on the pleadings 
against Rukavina in this case. The court may have later found that 
Rukavina was entitled to relief, including possession of the 
property, under the other claims raised in the pleadings, including 
the promises made by CTX, the waiver by CTX, the mutual mistake of 
the parties at the time the option was entered into, or under the 
enforcement of the Settlement Agreement entered into by CTX and 
Barney, wherein CTX agrees to honor the lease and option on 
Rukavina's behalf. The court's ruling that the option provision is 
legally unenforceable, although in error, is not alone sufficient 
to warrant a total judgment on the pleadings, as Rukavina may have 
been entitled to relief under the other claims in his pleadings. 
D. THE TERMS OF THE OPTION ARE NOT TOO 
INDEFINITE AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
The terms in the option provision are not too indefinite, 
as a matter of law, to be enforceable. A method was agreed to, at 
the time, for calculating a purchase price for the property. This 
agreed method is definite enough for an option to purchase real 
estate. Property Assistance v. Roberts, 768 P.2d 976 (Utah App. 
1989). The parties did not agree to negotiate a fair sales price 
in the future, but only agreed to wait until the expiration of the 
lease to obtain appraisals to determine the fair sales price. The 
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language "to determine a fair sales price," is ambiguous. It is 
not known whether the parties had agreed on a method for calculat-
ing a sales pric§ using the appraisals, which were to be implement-
ed at the time the lease expired; or whether the parties were going 
to obtain the appraisals and then sit down and renegotiate a sales 
price. 
The undisputed affidavits show that the parties agreed on 
a definite method to calculate the sales price, e.g. the average of 
the two appraisals, and that the appraisals were simply to be 
plugged into the previously agreed formula to determine the sales 
price. Parol evidence should have been considered by the court in 
determining what the parties' intention was as to the language "to 
determine a fair sales price." Property Assistance v. Roberts, Id. 
E. THE OPTION PROVISION IS NOT AN INTEGRATED 
CONTRACT; THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE CONSIDERED 
PAROL EVIDENCE IN MAKING THIS DETERMINATION. 
The question of interpretation of a contract is a 
question of law for the court. The court must determine by process 
of interpretation what the writing means. Before considering the 
applicability of the parol evidence rule in a contract dispute, the 
court must first determine whether the parties intended the writing 
to be an integrated contract. To resolve this question any 
relevant evidence is admissible. Union Bank v. Swenson, 707 P.2d 
663, 665 (Utah 1985). The trial court erred in failing to first 
determine and rule on the issue as to whether the option was 
intended as integrated contract before ruling on the admissibility 
of parol evidence. Id. at 665. 
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The trial court should have considered all relevant 
evidence, including the affidavits of the individuals negotiating 
the contract, to determine if the contract was intended as an 
integrated contract. See Ward v. Intermountain Farmers, 277 UAR 58 
(Ut.App. 1995) (when determining whether a contract is ambiguous, 
any relevant evidence must be considered. Other wise the determi-
nation of ambiguity is inherently one-sided, namely it is based 
solely on the "extrinsic evidence" of the judge's own linguistic 
education and experience. Although the terms of an instrument may 
seem clear to a particular reader -including a judge- this does not 
rule out the possibility that the parties chose the language of the 
agreement to express a different meaning. A judge should therefore 
consider any credible evidence offered to show the parties' 
intention). Id. 
The undisputed affidavits submitted reveal that the 
option provision was not intended as an integrated contract. The 
affidavits set forth the specific terms agreed to in explanation of 
the language used in the option provision (last sentence of 
paragraph 15) , stating that, "Each agent shall obtain a separate 
appraisal and at that time a fair sales price shall be determined." 
Furthermore, parol evidence should be considered when it 
appears that a complete and binding agreement may be voidable for 
fraud, duress, mutual mistake or the like, or it may be illegal. 
Warner v. Sirstins 838 P.2d 666, 669 (Ut.App. 1992). Such invali-
dating causes need not and generally do not appear on the face of 
the writing. Therefore, parol evidence may be admitted to show 
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mutual mistake occurring when both parties, at the time of 
contracting, share a misconception about a basic assumption or 
vital fact, upon which they base their bargain. Id. at 669. This 
is clearly shown in the affidavits submitted, as both parties 
assumed that the language they had chosen was sufficient to 
determine a definite purchase price for an enforceable option to 
purchase. 
Furthermore, even reading the face of the contract 
itself, indicates that the option provision was not intended as an 
integrated contract. Paragraph 15 states that "there are no terms 
of this agreement different (sic) from any of the proceding (sic) 
numbered paragraphs or in addition thereto except the following:" 
(emphasis added). The option provision then follows. The option 
provision therefore, clearly was not intended as part of an 
integrated contract and the court should have considered all 
relevant evidence in interpreting the option provision. 
F, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN STRIKING RUKAVINA'S 
MOTION TO ENFORCE THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 
REACHED IN CTX PROPERTIES V. BARNEY, 
CTX cannot and does not argue the merits of this Motion. 
The law in Utah is well settled that a third party beneficiary to 
a contract has the right to enforce the terms of the contract. 
This includes third party beneficiaries of settlement agreements. 
L&A Drywall. Inc. v. Whitmore Construction, 608 P.2d 626 (Utah 
1980). See also Hansen v. Greenriver Group, 748 P.2d 1102, 1104 
(Ut.App. 1988). 
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CTX and Barney, entered into a Settlement Agreement in 
CTX Properties v. Eloise C. Barney, Civil No. 900903134 PR, and as 
a condition of that settlement, Barney requested that CTX honor the 
option provision with Rukavina. The Settlement Agreement with 
Barney specifically provides, in clear and unambiguous language, 
that CTX will honor the option agreement contained in the lease 
with Rukavina. 
By filing this action CTX breached the terms of its 
Settlement Agreement by asserting, that the option is unenforceable 
and by refusing to honor the option exercised by Rukavina. 
Furthermore, any potential defense to the enforcement of the option 
agreement was waived by CTX in the Settlement Agreement. Surety 
Life Ins. Co. v. Rupp., 853 P.2d 366, 370 (Ut.App. 1992) (a party 
may legally contract to waive a defense); Continental Bank & Trust 
Co. v. Utah Sec. Mortcr. , 701 P.2d 1095, 1098 (Utah 1985), (finding 
of trial court on summary judgment that unambiguous language in 
guaranty agreement waives guarantors' defenses is affirmed). 
Since Rukavina is a third party beneficiary to the 
Settlement Agreement, which specifically provides that CTX will 
honor the option entered into with Rukavina, and this is a separate 
agreement from the lease itself, Rukavina's Motion to Enforce the 
Settlement Agreement with Barney should not have been summarily 
stricken by the Court based on the Court's interpretation of the 
separate lease agreement entered into by Rukavina. 
Rukavina is entitled to the enforcement of the terms of 
the Settlement Agreement with Barney to protect his rights. 
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Cerritos Trucking Co. v. Utah Venture No. 1. 645 P.2d 608 (Utah 
1982) (action for specific performance of option agreement to 
purchase realty granted and affirmed); Bradshaw v. Kershaw, 627 
P.2d 528 (Utah 1981) ; Garland v. Fleisch. 831 P.2d 107 (Utah 1992) . 
G. THE TRIAL COURT FOR ERRED IN RETROACTIVELY 
REINSTATING THE APRIL 20, 1993 JUDGMENT. 
The trial court erred in reinstating the April 20, 1993 
Judgment which was previously vacated for lack of standing and 
jurisdiction. Utah Statute 16-I0a-1502 U.C.A., precludes a foreign 
corporation from bringing or maintaining an action in the State 
until an application is filed with the division. Therefore, the 
court does not have jurisdiction over any matter brought by a 
foreign corporation until an application is filed. This standing 
and thus, jurisdiction, cannot be applied retroactively. Stephens 
v. Henderson, 741 P.2d 952 (Utah 1987) . § 68-3-3 U.C.A. specifi-
cally provides that a statute shall not be retroactively applied, 
unless it is so declared in the statute. 
The subsequent subsection, § 16-l0a-1502(3) U.C.A., 
allows the court to say a proceeding, until it determines whether 
the foreign corporation is required to file an application and if 
so the court is to further stay the proceeding until an application 
has been filed. 
CTX may proceed to obtain judgment, but only after an 
application has been filed. By reinstating the Judgment, the court 
has allowed CTX to totally circumvent the requirements of § 16-iOa-
1502(1), and by holding that the proceedings taken by CTX while an 
- 10 -
unregistered corporation are merely voidable and not void, the 
court has rendered the total section of no effect. 
Consistent with the language in the statute and to render 
the statute its intended effect, the better interpretation is that 
the matter is stayed and that any proceedings are stayed and thus 
void, until an application has been filed. 
H. THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING 
RUKAVINA'S MOTION TO AMEND HIS COMPLAINT. 
The trial court abused its discretion in not allowing 
Rukavina to amend his complaint. CTX was not unfairly prejudiced 
and had plenty of opportunity to answer the amended complaint, 
complete discovery and prepare for trial. 
The Third Party Defendants (as principals of the 
Plaintiff CTX) were well aware of the action, and Third Party 
Defendant Barney actually accepted service of the Third Party 
Complaint and filed an Answer to the Third Party Complaint. 
Rule 15 URCP, provides that a party may amend his 
pleading by leave of court and that leave of court shall be freely 
given when justice so requires. The primary considerations in 
considering a motion to amend are, whether the parties have 
adequate notice to meet the new issues, and whether any party 
receives an unfair advantage or disadvantage. Rincrwood v. Foreign 
Auto Works, Inc., 786 P.2d 1350 (Ut.App. 1990) cert, denied, 795 
P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990); See also Bekins Bar V Ranch v. Huth, 664 
P. 2d 455 (Utah 1983) (determination depends on whether opposing 
party would be put to unavoidable prejudice by having an issue 
adjudicated for which he had not had time to prepare). 
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In this case, there was no unfair advantage or unavoid-
able prejudice due to not enough time to prepare. On November 18, 
1994, pursuant to the court's own Order a Scheduling Conference was 
held wherein cut-off dates and deadlines were set. A discovery 
deadline was set for February 28, 1995. A motion deadline was set 
for December 9, 1994. The court set a hearing date on all motions 
for January 30, 1995 at 1:30. (Record 303). Rukavina's Motion to 
Amend was filed on the deadline set by the court, December 9, 1994 
(Record 310) and well before the discovery deadline. 
CTX was not unduly prejudiced and had ample opportunity 
to conduct further discovery and prepare for any new issues. 
Rukavina's Motion to Amend was filed within the time deadline set 
by the court and relied upon by Rukavina. The court abused its 
discretion and Rukavina was unduly prejudiced, by the court's 
denial of Rukavina's Motion to Amend in this case when Rukavina 
filed his motion on the deadline set by the court, and well before 
the discovery deadline. 
I. THE THIRD PARTY COMPLAINT SHOULD NOT HAVE 
BEEN DISMISSED AFTER BARNEY ACCEPTED SERVICE. 
Rule 4(b) URCP, provides that "in any action brought 
against two or more defendants on which service has been obtained 
upon one of them within the 12 0 days or such longer period as may 
be allowed by the court, the other or others may be served or 
appear at any time prior to trial." 
The Third Party Complaint as against Barney should not 
have been dismissed for untimely service under Rule 4(b) URCP after 
Barney agreed to accept service in the case and filed an Answer to 
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the Third Party Complaint. Any claim regarding the untimely 
service of Barney was thereby waived. The Court's dismissal, 
although without prejudice, greatly adds to the delay and cost of 
litigation and therefore, should not be allowed in this case. 
Rule 4 (b) URCP provides that once one defendant is served 
the other defendants can be served or appear at any time prior to 
trial. This is to prevent the preclusion of adding additional 
defendants after three months. Valley Asphalt, Inc., v, Eldon J. 
Stubbs Contsr., Inc., 714 P.2d 1142 (Utah 1986) . Barney, one of 
the Third Party Defendants in this case was served and therefore 
Wright, as an additional Third Party Defendant in this action, may 
be served at any time prior to trial. Id. 
The trial court erred in dismissing the Third Party 
Complaint against Wright under Rule 4 URCP. The court certainly 
erred in dismissing Barney from the case after Barney had already 
accepted service of the Third Party Complaint and had filed an 
Answer to the Third Party Complaint. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court erred in enforcing the settlement 
agreement in this case, based on two letters proposing a global 
settlement of five cases, which was never agreed to by all the 
parties. 
The court erred in failing to make an initial determi-
nation, considering all the evidence, as to whether the parties 
intended the option provision to be an integrated contract, before 
ruling on the exclusion of parol evidence. 
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The trial court erred in granting judgment on the 
pleadings, finding the option provision too indefinite to be 
enforceable, when there was a definite method agreed to for 
calculating the purchase price. The trial court erred in finding 
that the option provision was not ambiguous, so as to allow parol 
evidence to determine its meaning. 
The trail court erred in striking Rukavina's Motion to 
Enforce the Settlement Agreement entered in CTX v. Barney, a 
separate case, when Rukavina was clearly an intended beneficiary. 
The trial court erred in retroactively reinstating a 
judgment entered when CTX had no standing and the court had no 
jurisdiction over the matter. 
Finally, the trial court abused its discretion in denying 
Rukavina's Motion to Amend and in dismissing the Third Party 
Complaint, when Third Party Defendant, Barney had accepted service 
and filed an Answer to the Third Party Complaint. 
RELIEF SOUGHT 
This Court should reverse the trial court's final Order, 
and find that there was no global settlement reached as proposed in 
the two letters of counsel, and that CTX is not entitled to 
unilaterally change the terms of the global settlement discussed, 
to enforce settlement in this case only, while proceeding with 
litigation in this case, as well as, the other cases. 
This Court should find that the option provision was not 
intended as an integrated contract and that it is ambiguous, thus 
requiring the consideration of parol evidence. This Court, upon 
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consideration of all the evidence, should find that there was a 
definite method agreed to for calculating the purchase price, and 
thus, the option is enforceable as a matter of law. 
This Court should vacate the trial court's Judgment on 
the Pleadings and allow Rukavina to file his amended pleadings, to 
proceed against the Third Party Defendants, and be entitled to have 
a hearing on the merits of his Motion to Enforce the Settlement 
Agreement entered into between CTX and Barney. 
DATED this 9th day of September, 1996. 
SMITH & HANNA 
By: ^ y ^ A 
Ige W/ Call 
^jjJ^^a^A^ 
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